Kashmir Dispute: Neither bilateral nor territorial

Can India-Pakistan talks undo a knot of antagonism?

The international community has overwhelmingly welcomed the recent move by India and Pakistan to resume bilateral dialogue after three years. It is a goodwill gesture to build confidence between the two "threshold nuclear neighbours and South Asian arch rivals," which could lead the region to peace and progress as well as an end to the untold human misery in Kashmir.

Both Prime Ministers, H.D. Deve Gowda and Nawaz Sharif, have shown a willingness for "meaningful discussions on all outstanding issues including the Jammu and Kashmir dispute." Accordingly, an announcement made by both governments called for a foreign secretary level talks to be held in New Delhi from 28th to 31st March 1997.

Since both India and Pakistan are the custodians of the disputed territory, a process of sustainable bilateral dialogues between India and Pakistan is inevitable to set the framework for "a peaceful and final settlement" of the Kashmir issue. However, the issue is neither bilateral nor territorial, but an issue of a right to self-determination for the 13 million people in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Nevertheless, the Kashmir dispute is a major stumbling block that has caused hardship for the people in both countries.

The dispute

The Indian Independence Act, passed by the British Parliament on 18th July 1947, partitioned British India into two sovereign nations - Hindustan (India) and Pakistan. The Rulers of 584 Princely States were given the option to decide their own future affiliation.

The Hindus opted for India. Ironically, when the small State of Junagadh in Western India, with a Muslim ruler presiding more than a 75 percent Hindu population, chose accession to Pakistan, India demanded a plebiscite on the issue. On 20th February 1948, after Indian troops had occupied the territory, a popular vote overwhelmingly reversed the ruler's prerogative and chose for accession to India.

In a similar situation, this time the Maharajah, a Hindu presiding over a state with a 90 percent Muslim majority, unilaterally decided to go with India. That was on 26th October 1947. Lord Mountbatten, then governor-general of India, conditionally accepting the Maharajah's accession said: "It is my Government's wish that as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader, the question of the state's accession should be settled by a reference to the people." India's Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, in a broadcast on All India Radio (2nd November 1947) proclaimed that "we have declared that the fate of Kashmir is ultimately to be decided by the people . . . that pledge we have given . . . we will not and cannot back out of . . . We are prepared, when peace, law and order has been established, to have a referendum held under international auspices like the United Nations . . . I can't imagine a more fairer and more just offer."

India presented the Kashmir dispute to the United Nations Security Council on 31st December 1947. In that document India reiterated Nehru's plebiscite conditions and his promise. In response, Pakistan charged India with having manoeuvred the Maharajah's accession.

The Security Council Resolutions, demanding an immediate cease-fire, would be followed by a UN supervised Plebiscite.

India has since been trying to strengthen its grip over Kashmir by any means necessary.

Kashmiris are the central party to the issue

From Lord Mountbatten's promise to have the issue "settled by reference to the people"; Jawaharlal Nehru's vision that "the fate of Kashmir is ultimately to be decided by the people"; to the UN Resolutions which gives the people their right to determine their own future, the war rages like never before. These references have made the people of Kashmir a major party to the issue.

Moreover, the tremendous suffering and repression the people have experienced over the last fifty years and particularly since October 1989, have strengthened their position in participating in any future resolution.

Therefore, the Kashmir dispute cannot be effectively resolved unless all three parties (India, Pakistan and the people of Kashmir) are involved in the process.

Bilateral solution: a failed exercise

In the past, India tried bilateral talks. For example, the agreement between Sheikh Abdullah and Jawaharlal Nehru in 1952 and then later, a pact between Sheikh Abdullah and Madame Indira Gandhi in 1975 which sought to bypass Pakistan, served only to prolong the dispute. Likewise, the Tashkent agreement of 1966 between India and Pakistan, caused by the pressure of the former Soviet Union, sought to bypass the people of Kashmir. The result was a stalemate. Although the Simla Agreement of 1972 is irrelevant to the Kashmir dispute, it failed to stimulate a comprehensive peace process, except that it did visualise a "final settlement." Every agreement which has not provided for a concrete course of action towards determining Kashmir's status by the will of its people has only allowed the dispute to fester.

The present situation:

"The conflict in Kashmir, which erupted into near civil war in 1990, emerged out of a fifty-year [India's] political struggle for control of the territory. Both India and Pakistan claim control of Kashmir; the unresolved status of Kashmir continues to be the most serious impediment to ending tensions between the two South Asian enemies which many observers fear could lead to another, possibly nuclear, war. Although, Kashmir has a majority Muslim population, it has had a long history of religious tolerance and a unique culture, referred to as Kashmiriyat, which combines elements of the three major religions which have flourished there: Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam. However, since the early 1950s, India's attempts to control the state through rigged elections and other political machinations fuelled resentment among the state's Muslim political leaders, and ultimately led to the emergence of Muslim militant groups committed to fighting for independence. By 1990, popular resentment towards India's policies in the state had grown into a mass movement for azadi--independence. The militant groups which have been fighting for independence from India are divided between those who believe the territory should become part of Pakistan and those who believe that Kashmir should become an independent state. Some of the groups openly espouse an Islamic ideology; others advocate a secular Kashmiri state that would include Kashmiri Buddhists, Hindus and others. While Indian government has sought to hold Pakistan entirely responsible for the escalation in fighting that has taken place since 1989 and has blamed Pakistan for "exporting" Islamic fundamentalism to the state. Although Pakistan has taken advantage of the situation by . . . providing support to the militants, in fact, the roots of the Kashmir crisis are indigenous and originate in India's central government's attempts to exert political control over the state.

"Government forces operating in Kashmir include the Indian army and India's federal security forces, the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), the Border Security Force (BSF), and the Special Task Force. The army's role in the conflict expanded in 1993 with the introduction of the Rashtriya Rifles, an elite army unit created specifically for counter-insurgency operations in Kashmir. As of 1996, at least 300,000 troops were deployed in the valley, including those positioned along the Line of Control [Cease-fire Line]. The local Jammu and Kashmir policemen are generally not involved in counter-insurgency operations, largely because they are believed to be sympathetic to the insurgency. However in 1995, the Special Task Force (STF), a counter-insurgency division of the Jammu and Kashmir Police, made up of mainly non-Muslim [and] non-Kashmiri recruits, was formed apparently to create the impression that the counter-insurgency effort had local support. In each district, Special Task Force Operations are headed by the superintendent of police (SP) for operations." (Source: Human Rights Watch, INDIA'S SECRET ARMY IN KASHMIR, MAY 1996).

The role of the international community

Trade issues topped the international community's interest in India, although they are somewhat concerned with the security of South Asia.

Kashmiris are dismayed by the lack of action by the world powers to help stop the carnage in Kashmir and by their virtual indifference to the situation. The disparity between their inaction and their repeated assertion that protection of human rights and encouragement of democratic development are their major foreign policy goals are difficult for the people of Kashmir to understand.

The international community's silence does not mean they support India's position on Kashmir or approve massive violations of human rights.

However, they have preferred, so far, to use indirect and lukewarm diplomacy, such as India's recent defeat in the election for a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council.

Their repeated statements have been: "Kashmir is a disputed area," or, "taking into consideration the aspiration of the Kashmir people."

Nonetheless, stressing bilateral dialogues and "mediation" only if India wants it, suggests that not a single western industrialised country is ready to upset India.

Unfortunately, Pakistan has not been in a position, so far, to mobilise favourable international support.

The Organisation of Islamic Conference has strongly supported, time and again, a peaceful solution to the dispute according to the UN Resolutions.

Dialogues

Expected talks at the official level can be useful if they reflect a sense of urgency and prepare the ground for an earnest effort at the highest level to frame a step-by-step plan. More talk at a level lower than the political leadership of the two countries - and that too at a leisurely pace - will in no way defuse the situation. Unintentionally though, it will mock the agony of the people of Kashmir rather than assuage it. If a response to the gravity of the situation is intended, the following measures are essential:

i) There must be an immediate and complete cessation of military and paramilitary actions by Indian forces against the people of Kashmir;

ii) Torture and executions of persons arrested and captured by Indian forces must be immediately stopped;

iii) All bunkers, watch towers and barricades set up by the Indian military and paramilitary forces in towns and villages must be immediately dismantled;

iv) The military presence in towns and villages must be completely withdrawn;

v) All those imprisoned in connection with resistance to the Indian occupation must be immediately and unconditionally released and cases instituted against them under the so-called emergency laws must be withdrawn.

vi) The Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, the National Security Act and the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, must be annulled with respect to Kashmir;

vii) The right of peaceful association, assembly and demonstration must be restored to the people;

viii) The representatives of the people of Jammu and Kashmir must be fully associate;

ix) The Governments of India and Pakistan should provide facilities to the Kashmiri leadership on both sides of the cease-fire line to confer and submit their own proposals regarding the procedures for peaceful settlement;

x) Provide for each successive step towards settlement being supervised by the United Nations or any impartial agreed upon body set for the purpose.

These ten steps would constitute a moratorium on the use of force and on the ongoing harassment of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) leaders. However, for the talks between India and Pakistan to have any real significance, a joint declaration from them is needed to the effect that:

a) they do not contemplate a military solution to the Kashmir problem;

b) the two Prime Ministers are ready to meet to set a peace process in motion;

c) the genuine representatives of the people of Kashmir will be fully associated with the process;

d) should a stalemate arise, India and Pakistan are willing to invite or accept impartial mediation and make reference to the United Nations.

At this time, setting a stage for settlement rather than getting bogged down with the shape that the settlement will take, is dangerous and to indulge in this, or to encourage it, will not bring about a solution. Any attempt to do so at this point of time amounts to playing into the hands of those who would prefer to maintain a status quo even though it is intolerable to the people of Kashmir and also a threat to peace in South Asia. The raising of quasi-legal or pseudo-legal questions during the preparatory phase about the final settlement will only serve to befog the issue and to convey the wrong impression that the dispute is too complex to be resolved and that India and Pakistan hold equally inflexible positions. Such an impression does great injury to the people's cause.

The people of Kashmir are mindful of the existence in India of sections of sane and enlightened opinions that deplore the Kashmir policy pursued by their Government and have concluded that it is causing grave damage to India's own long-term interests since it has besmirched India's reputation and lowered its international standing. Compared to the clamorous bigoted forces in India, these sections speak only in soft tones, and have yet to influence policy-makers. Nevertheless, their efforts have deeply gratified Kashmiris and will sustain their campaign, which responds equally to genuine patriotism and to human conscience.

This year, India and Pakistan each celebrate 50th anniversary of independence from Britain. Both countries should take the opportunity of this time to adopt a realistic and pragmatic approach and carve a new era for the people in their neighbourhood. The international community, and western industrialised nations in particular, has a moral obligation to help the two countries move towards meaningful dialogue. The time is ripe for a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir dispute.